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Abstract 
 
 The high cost of failure for microelectronic devices operating in the space 
environment has led to a need for an accurate characterization of a device’s reliability 
prior to being deployed.  In addition, significant cost savings can be achieved by 
determining this reliability prior to fabrication.  High performance and flexibility 
requirements for many space applications have led to an integration of small feature-sized 
field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) into system designs.  Specifically, feature sizes 
as small as 130, 90, and 65 nm.  In this research, a characterization of the space 
environment is constructed specifically to address the typical conditions that can affect 
the performance and functionality of small feature-sized FPGAs, centered on 
temperature, non-ideal supply voltage, and radiation effects.  A simulation technique is 
developed to determine the reliability of a microelectronic device prior to fabrication and 
deployment into the space environment.  The technique is based on identifying the key 
elements of a circuit, simulating these key elements under each characterized condition 
individually, and then a comprehensive simulation of the elements under all enumerated 
combinations of the characterized conditions at the transistor-level using the HSPICE 
device simulation tool.  Reliability calculations are performed based on simulation results 
and identified critical performance criteria.  A demonstration of the technique is 
accomplished showing the poor reliability of non-radiation hardened small feature-sized 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) FPGAs in four common satellite orbits around the 
earth.  The results are then compared to an established, radiation hardened FPGA.
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PARAMETRIC RELIABILITY OF SPACE-BASED FIELD PROGRAMMABLE 
GATE ARRAYS 
 
 
I. Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
This chapter will discuss the following topics: 
 1) Motivation for this work, 
 2) Presentation of problem statement, 
 3) Plan of attack to address this statement, 
 4) Contributions this work will provide. 
1.2 Motivation 
The world that people interact with has expanded.  Everyday, resources are used 
that are non-terrestrial to complete routine tasks.  This is even more evident in military 
objectives.  To maintain expected performance on military operations, space-based assets 
are extensively used.  The reliability of these assets can determine success or failure for a 
given operation.  During the first Gulf War in 1991, capabilities provided by Global 
Positioning Satellites (GPS) allowed coalition forces to successfully maneuver without 
landmarks to their objectives.  A failure in the GPS system during these maneuvers 
would have caused a greater loss of life.  This reliance on space-based assets also applies 
to portions of the civilian sector.  Companies invest a great deal of capital to acquire the 
capabilities offered by spaced-based systems.  For every second an acquired space-based 
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 system is inoperable, an amazing amount of money is lost.  Reliability of performance is 
key to both military and civilian space-based assets.   
Project costs of space-based applications are very large and most project failures 
are catastrophic.  The upfront development costs create most often a single production 
item.  These developmental costs, as well as the cost to put the asset in an operational 
position, increase the cost of failure.  In 1998, the space industry lost a total of $1.8 
billion from all causes of failures [8].  Though the majority of the costs were generated 
through launch failures, a significant portion were caused by failures attributed to the 
space environment.  From 1998 to 2004, there were 12 satellite failures found to be 
caused by radiation events that lead to a loss of $500 million [28].  The majority of these 
losses could have been prevented by simulation of the effects caused by the space 
environment prior to placement of the microelectronic device in the system design.   
FPGAs have the potential to be one of the leading causes of future failures in 
space-based applications due to the sensitivity of the FPGA’s configuration structure.  
Though sensitive to the space environment, the inherent flexibility and high performance 
of a FPGA makes it ideal for space-based applications.  Because of the increased 
requirements placed on space-based systems, developers have started implementing 
smaller feature-sized devices in their designs.  The reduction in feature size leads to 
increased performance, but also to increased sensitivity to the harsh environmental 
conditions of space.  There is no comprehensive research on the reliability of small 
feature-sized FPGAs in the space environment to include temperature, non-ideal supply 
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 voltage, and radiation.  Both COTS and radiation hardened FPGAs should be evaluated 
under these conditions for likely operational orbits. 
  
1.3 Problem Statement 
There is both a civilian and military demonstrated need to develop a technique to 
simulate or test the reliability and performance of microelectronic devices prior to 
fabrication and insertion into the space environment.  The most notable of these devices 
is the FPGA due to the inherent sensitivity of its configuration mechanisms to radiation 
and non-ideal operating conditions.  To accomplish this reliability determination, the 
space environments effects on a microelectronic device must first be characterized.  Next, 
a simulation technique must be developed to test a proposed device under these effects in 
common operating orbits.  Finally, reliability needs to be determined based off published 
parameters. 
1.4 Plan of Attack 
In this thesis, the parametric impacts on reliability caused by radiation, 
temperature, and dynamic power levels are explored for devices with feature sizes of less 
than or equal to 130 nm.  A technique to simulate the cumulative effect of these impacts 
is developed.  The simulation technique will be demonstrated by determining the 
parametric reliability of circuits representative of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) small 
feature-sized FPGAs.  The reliability of performance will be calculated for these devices 
deployed in four different commonly used orbits.  Architectural enhancements are then 
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 proposed for the critical portions of a FPGA that are determined to be the most 
vulnerable to these effects.  Finally, simulations of these modifications are performed to 
determine if any increase in reliability has been achieved. 
1.5 Contributions 
The five major contributions contained in this thesis are as follows: 
1) A characterization of space environmental effects on bulk silicon 
complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) microelectronic 
devices in common orbits. 
 2) Development of techniques to simulate these effects using device-level 
circuit simulation tools prior to manufacturing. 
3) A demonstration of this technique to show the limited expected reliability 
of small feature-sized non-radiation hardened FPGAs in the space 
environment. 
4) Modifications to critical portions of a small feature-sized FPGA’s 
architecture and simulations to determine if an increase in reliability of 
performance has been achieved. 
5) Comparison of COTS radiation hardened FPGA reliability versus non-
radiation hardened. 
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 II. Background Information 
2.1 Overview 
The materials covered in this chapter are 
1) Description of the causes of space radiation effects, 
2) Discussion of specific radiation effects encountered by microelectronics, 
3) Effects of non-ideal temperature to metal oxide semiconductor field effect 
transistor (MOSFET) devices, 
4) Effects of non-ideal supply voltage levels to MOSFET devices, 
2.2 Space Radiation Environment 
Platforms that leave the protection of the Earth’s atmosphere, are exposed to 
increased radiation hazards.  Without the atmosphere to protect them, they are vulnerable 
to strikes by particles that travel through space with energies up to hundreds of GeVs.  
The three major sources of these particles are galactic cosmic rays (GCR), solar events, 
and particles trapped by the Earth’s magnetic field. 
The three major types of solar events that cause radiation effects in 
microelectronics deployed in a space environment are solar flares, anomalous large solar 
flares (ALS), and coronal mass ejections (CME).  These events follow a nine to thirteen 
year cycle of activity.  One average eleven-year cycle is composed of seven years of high 
activity, followed by four years of relatively quiet activity.  The cyclical nature of solar 
events is shown in Figure 1.  This model was generated using data recorded over a thirty 
year period by spacecraft, rockets, balloons, and satellites.  The spikes in proton fluence 
of over 109 protons/cm2 are defined as ALSs. 
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Figure 1.  Solar events of >30 MeV proton fluences [8]. 
  The most significant of these events is the CME.  This event is caused by the 
explosive energy generated by a plasma eruption on the sun’s surface.  This energy 
rapidly accelerates particles into the solar wind.  These particles can have energies up to 1 
GeV, with non-trivial fluxes of 105 cm-2s-1.  The composition of this injection of particles 
into the solar wind is greater than 90 % protons and only 0.1 % heavy ions [21].  Figure 2 
shows the low instance rate of proton strikes greater than 92.5 MeV caused by solar 
events over a 22 year period. 
 
Figure 2.  Intensity of protons from solar events with energies over 92.5 MeV [21]. 
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 According to Kenneth LaBel of NASA, system developers can plan for significant 
solar event conditions to compose only 2 % of mission time over a typical solar cycle 
[31].  Typical solar flare fluences are less than trapped proton fluences of similar energy.  
ALS and CMEs, due to their high energies and fluxes, cannot be hardened against, but 
must be mitigated through programming and layout techniques. 
GCRs are composed of particles that originate from outside the solar system.  In 
theory, these particles are generated by supernovas of far off stars, or maybe even during 
the “big bang”.  These particles can have energies in the GeV range but have much less 
flux (cm-2 s-1) than other sources of particles. 
Table 1.  Distance above mean sea level for common orbits. 
Low Earth (LEO) Medium Earth (MEO) Geosynchronous (GEO) 
200 km to 2000 km 2000 km to 35,786 km 35,786 km 
 
  Lower energy (< 100 MeV) GCR particle strikes have a low effect on 
microelectronic devices in LEO and MEO due to deflection of the particles by the Earth’s 
magnetic field.  Figure 3 shows the relationship between flux and GCR energy for GEO 
and interplanetary missions.  The flux GCRs with a LET value of greater then 10 MeV is 
negligible to all calculations in this work.  These events will occur less than one time a 
day and the strength of these events is accounted for by proton particle tolerance. 
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Figure 3.  GCR energy vs. flux for GEO [21]. 
As can be seen in Figure 4, the most abundant particles in GCRs are hydrogen 
through iron (atomic numbers 1-26).  Due to the extremely high energies and low 
occurrence of strikes over a mission lifetime, it is not feasible to radiation harden a 
CMOS microelectronic device to the extreme GCR particle strikes that are greater than 
100 MeV.  Lower energy strikes, as discussed prior, are at equivalent energy levels of 
trapped proton strikes, but at lower flux levels.  Thus, the effect on reliability of these 
lower energy GCRs can be disregarded if trapped proton reliability effects are calculated. 
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Figure 4.  Abundance of elements in GCRs [21]. 
Particles trapped by the Earth’s magnetic field can be a major radiation hazard.  
This trapped particle belt is composed of protons and electrons.  Trapped electrons can 
have fluxes of up to 10 MeV at fluxes of up to 3x106 cm-2 s-1.  Light shielding prevents 
the majority of strikes from trapped electrons [8].  The main particle for system designers 
to be concerned about are protons that have been captured in the Earth’s magnetic field.  
These particles can have energies of up to 100 MeVs at fluxes of 105 cm-2s-1.  If the 
mission allows, a platform can be placed in a LEO that is between the two major belts of 
these trapped particles.  The Earth’s magnetic field then acts as a shield to capture or 
deflect the majority of particles moving on the solar wind prior to reaching the sensitive 
electronics of these platforms in a LEO and MEO orbits.  Figure 5 shows the Earth’s 
magnetic field deflecting and trapping particles incoming toward Earth from the solar 
wind. 
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Figure 5.  The Earth’s magnetosphere [21]. 
2.3 Radiation Effects  
Detrimental radiation effects are primarily caused by strikes of protons, electrons, 
or heavy ions.  For the purpose of this work, we can disregard the effect of electron 
strikes due to the relatively light shielding required to protect against them.  It requires 
only 200 mil of aluminum to negate the effects of most electron strikes [8].   
 
Figure 6.  Electron dose over a 10-year period with 200 mils of shielding [8]. 
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 Proton and Heavy ion strikes caused by the phenomenon discussed in the space 
radiation environment can lead to both recoverable and non-recoverable faults in 
MOSFET transistors.  
A strike by these particles will create electron and hole pairs along the path of 
penetration.  The “funnel” created by the strike will dissipate quickly, but momentarily a 
channel will be formed between the surface and the substrate.  This behaves like a wire, 
connecting the portion of the MOSFET hit by the particle strike to the body of the device.  
Figure 7 shows the funnel created in a MOSFET device.  The depth of these penetrations 
are determined by the energy of the particle, the type of particle, and the material it is 
striking.  This characteristic of a particle is described as its linear energy transfer (LET).  
LET is the amount of energy deposited in a material by a particle as it penetrates in units 
of 
2MeV cm
mg
⎛ ⎞⋅⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
.   
 
Figure 7.  Electron/hole pairs created by particle strike [43]. 
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 The main consequence of one of these particle strikes to designers of CMOS 
circuits are single event effects (SEE).  This effect is the result of a change in voltage 
level on the affected area due to a momentary connection to the substrate.  The results of 
SEEs are transient pulses in combinational or linear circuits, ‘bit-flips’ in storage devices, 
or latch-up in older, low performance technologies.   
Another effect caused by a single particle strike is displacement damage (DD).  
This happens when the particle passing through a material penetrates the crystal lattice of 
the silicon.  This penetration results in a displacement of atoms that can have a negative 
effect on the drain to source current of a MOSFET.  This result has minimal effect on the 
actual performance of MOSFET transistors and is not discussed further in this work. 
Single event latch-up (SEL) is also caused by single particle strikes.  SEL can be 
described as the state a MOSFET is in when the channel created by the particle strike 
allows current to flow unregulated between areas of potential difference in the device.  
This effect can cause permanent damage to a transistor, but is not a significant problem 
for modern electronics due to the popular use of an epitaxial layer in the construction of 
most devices.   
Over time, a device will be struck by multiple particles.  Each of these strikes 
leaves a residual charge that can accumulate over time and reduce the performance of the 
device.  Holes will slowly migrate to the top of the gate oxide. After enough are there, the 
device will be inoperable, with either a permanently open or closed channel.  This effect 
is classified as total ionizing dose (TID), and is primarily cause by electron or ion strikes.  
12 
 As was shown in Figure 6, light shielding can decrease the amount of dose accumulated.  
This effect will not be addressed in this work. 
Table 1 contains a summation of the sources of particles and their effects on 
MOSFET devices.  An analysis of the data in the table shows that with the exception of 
GCRs, radiation hardening a circuit to a proton strike of 100 MeV at a flux of 105 cm-2s-1 
will classify a circuit as radiation hardened.  GCR and ALS must be addressed through 
mitigation techniques such as redundancy and strategic programming due to their high 
worst-case energies.  Particle energies and fluxes that a microelectronic device will 
encounter are mission specific.  The strength and abundance of a particle over time is 
dependant on orbit, solar cycle, and shielding.  Characteristics for customized orbits can 
be estimated using modes such as AP-8, AE-8, CRÈME, and SOLPRO [34],[35],[36]. 
Table 2.  Summary of radiation phenomena and their effects on MOSFETs. 
Phenomena Energy MeV Intensity cm-2s-1 Effects 
Trapped Protons Up to 100s < 1x105 TID, DD, SEE 
Trapped Electrons < 10 < 3x106 TID, DD 
Galactic Cosmic Rays Up to 1000s < 10 SEE 
Solar Events Up to 100s < 1x105 TID, DD, SEE 
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 2.4 Temperature Effects 
Electronic components utilized in a space environment need to be able to operate 
correctly at a wide range of temperatures.  According to guidelines published by the 
Defense Supply Center [7] normal operating temperatures in a satellite range from -35 °C 
to 60°C.  However, at worst case the guide recommends designers to plan for operation at 
temperatures as low as -45 °C and as high as 90 °C.  At these temperatures, the transistors 
that make up the critical components of a FPGA can behave in an undesirable manner.  
This can lead to incorrect operation or even failure of the device.  The two major effects 
of non-ideal temperature are threshold voltage shift for transistors in the “off” state, and a 
decrease in saturation current for transistors in the “on” state. 
The threshold voltage of a MOSFET transistor is very dependent on temperature.  
The following approximation in equation (1) shows the linear relationship of threshold 
voltage to temperature  
 ( ) ( ) ( )t t r vtV T V T k T T= − − r  (1) 
where Vt is threshold voltage in Volts, T is the absolute temperature in Kelvin, Tr is the 
room temperature in Kelvin, and kvt is a fitting parameter [1].  Equation (1) shows that an 
increase in temperature will lead to a decrease in threshold voltage.  This decrease results 
in a higher leakage current, which can lead to an undesired operation of critical portions 
of a circuit, as well as increased power consumption.   
An increase in temperature will also lead to an decrease in saturation current.  
This is due to the saturation current of a MOSFET being directly related to mobility as 
can be seen in  
14 
  ( 2ds ox gs tWI C V VL⎛ ⎞= μ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ )  (2) 
where Ids is the drain to source saturation current in amps, Cox is the gate oxide 
capacitance, W is the width of the channel, L is the length of the channel, Vgs is the gate to 
source voltage, Vt is the device threshold, and m is the mobility [29]. 
Mobility can be described as  
 Εμ = ν  (3) 
where m is mobility in cm2/Vÿs, E is electric field between the source and drain, and v is 
average carrier velocity in the channel [6].  An approximate relationship between 
mobility and temperature is shown in  
 ( ) ( )
k
r
r
T
T
μ−⎛ ⎞μ Τ = μ Τ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (4) 
where T is absolute temperature, Tr is room temperature, and km is a fitting parameter in 
the range of 1.2 to 2.0 [1]. 
An example of non-ideal temperature affecting the mission of a satellite occurred 
in April of 1993.  The GOES-7 experienced a one-hour period where communication was 
unreliable due to an eclipse decreasing the temperature to a point that the frequency of 
the receiver surpassed its 5 kHz frequency limit [5].  This was due to the decrease in 
threshold voltage and increase in saturation current of the MOSFET transistors in the 
receiver.  The device operated faster, but at a speed that was out of design constraints. 
15 
 2.5 Non-Ideal Supply Voltage Effects 
Small feature-sized integrated circuits do not have much tolerance for non-ideal 
supply voltage in their design.  To have correct operation of the individual transistors that 
comprise these circuits, a predictable potential difference between the supply voltage and 
ground must be maintained.  If this voltage increases or decreases by a significant 
amount, operations will not be performed correctly due to failures in specific transistors 
or timing of synchronous portions of the circuit. 
In a terrestrial environment, the majority of failures for a non-ideal supply voltage 
are caused by users of the microelectronic device.  This is due to the device being 
deployed in a controlled environment.  In a non-terrestrial environment though, there are 
a number of natural environmental factors that can temporarily or permanently alter the 
supply voltage to an integrated circuit.  According to a NASA case study of over 100 
mission failures over a twenty-year period [5], the major causes of non-ideal power 
conditions are a result of the following five environmental factors: 
1) Power supply performance due to the thermal environment, 
2) Shift in floating potential, current loss, and re-attraction of 
contaminants due to plasma, 
3) Power allocation due to the solar environment, 
4) Degradation in solar cell output due to ionizing radiation, 
5) Induced potential effects due to magnetic fields. 
In a MOSFET, when a voltage bias is applied to the gate and passes a certain 
level, a channel will be formed between the drain and the source of the device.  The 
16 
 conductance of the channel varies depending on the potential difference between the gate 
and the body.  Assuming a potential difference exists between the drain and the source, 
when a bias voltage is applied to the gate relative to the body and exceeds Vt, a channel 
will form between the drain and source allowing current to flow.   
A change in the supply voltage for a circuit will lead to a change in the maximum 
voltage able to be applied to portions of a transistor in the circuit.  If this level falls below 
Vt, a transistor will not function.  If there is a reduction in supply voltage, but it is still 
greater than the Vt of a transistor, the switching characteristics of the transistor will 
change.  For a negative-channel metal-oxide semiconductor (NMOS) the amount of time 
for the drain current to fall to sub-threshold levels will decrease which leads to faster 
“off” transitions.  For positive-channel metal-oxide semiconductors (PMOS) devices, the 
opposite is true, faster “on” transitions.  Timing is crucial to the performance and 
operation of modern synchronous Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) 
circuits.  Changes in states or values of transistors are expected to occur at certain 
intervals.  If these intervals are not in the designed period, the circuit will not behave as 
designed. 
The reduction of the voltage between the gate and the source can also lead to a 
less robust performance.  As supply voltage decreases, the threshold voltage will remain 
constant due to the threshold voltage being a function of process parameters and 
temperature as given by 
 
( )s A B
t
0
2 qN 2
V
C
ε Ψ
B2≈ + Ψ  (5) 
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  AB
i
NkT ln
q n
⎛ ⎞Ψ = ⎜⎝ ⎠⎟
 (6) 
where Vt is the threshold voltage in volts, sε  is the permittivity of silicon, q 
is , Y191.60218 x 10 C− B is the potential required for strong inversion, k is boltzmann’s 
constant, C
B
0 is the gate capacitance per unit area, NA is the density of carriers, ni is the 
intrinsic carrier concentration, and T is temperature .  Since the maximum voltage 
level that can be applied to a node has been decreased, transistors will be more sensitive 
to unforeseen fluctuations in voltage levels.  These unforeseen fluctuations are expected 
in the operation of an integrated circuit and thus designers implement tolerances or 
margins in their designs to ensure predictable operation of the circuit.  As these 
tolerances (noise margins, radiation, and manufacturing variations) decrease, the 
predicted reliability of a circuit becomes unknown. 
[6]
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 III. Methodology 
3.1 Overview 
This chapter discusses the developed simulation method to determine reliability of 
a microelectronic device prior to deployment in the space environment.  The simulation 
structure is comprised of the following four steps 
1) Identification of critical components, 
2) Simulation of each component with respect to each phenomena separately, 
3) Comprehensive enumerative phenomena simulation for each element in 
each sensitive state, 
4) Reliability determination. 
The simulation structure is described in general, and in detail of how it applies to the 
specific FPGA models used for the simulation demonstration. 
3.2 Choice of FPGA Models 
 To demonstrate the low reliability of COTS FPGAs in the space environment 
models developed were based upon the Virtex II Pro, Virtex 4, and the Virtex 5.  All of 
the Virtex family of FPGAs have similar architectures, but have implemented newer 
technologies in each generation.  Specifically the generational reduction in feature size 
has lead to a higher transistor density on the device.  This leads to a decrease in the 
reliability of the FPGA in the space environment due to the increased number of total 
radiation sensitive areas and the reduction in radiation induced noise tolerance.  Table 3 
and Table 4 list parameters of a minimum, nominal, and maximum instance of each 
device.  The number of configuration bits is especially important when determining space 
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 reliability of a FPGA.  As can be seen, the number of configuration bits range from 1.3 
million bits to 82 million bits.  Each of these bits plays a key role in the configuration of 
the devices.  Configurable logic blocks (CLB) are the heart of FPGA functionality.  
These are cells or blocks in the device that can be configured to perform multiple 
functions.  CLBs are what give FPGAs the flexibility that makes them so useful.  Feature 
size of the FPGAs is of particular importance to space reliability.  The length of the 
channel between the drain and source of a MOSFET directly affects the area on a device 
that is sensitive to particle strikes.  It is shown in Table 3 and Table 4 that the feature size 
or channel length ranges from 130 nm to 65 nm.  The last parameter of interest is the 
maximum clock frequency.  This parameter will be used in reliability calculations to 
determine the impact of the space environment on FPGA reliability.   
Table 3.  Significant Virtex II Pro and Virtex 4 parameters [11], [12], [13], [14], [15]. 
Virtex II Pro Virtex 4 
 Min Nominal Max Min Nominal Max 
Product Number XC2VP2 XC2VP40 XC2VP100 XC4VLX15 XC4VSX55 XC4VFX140
Conf Bits 1.3 M 12 M 35 M 5 M 24 M 50 M 
CLBs 5,632 77,568 176,384 24,576 98,304 272,672 
Feature Size nm 130 130 130 90 90 90 
Max Clock MHz 400 400 400 500 500 500 
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 Table 4.  Significant Virtex 5 parameters [17], [18], [19]. 
Virtex 5 
 Min Nominal Max 
Product Number XC5VLX30 XC5VLX110T XC5VLX330T 
Conf Bits 8 M 31 M 82 M 
CLBs 19,200 69,120 207,360 
Feature Size nm 65 65 65 
Max Clock MHz 500 500  500  
3.3 Determining Critical Portions of Circuit 
Analysis of a circuit is the first step of the simulation procedure.  By careful 
examination of the design of a microelectronic device, certain information can be gained 
to limit the number of simulations.  It is unreasonable to simulate every device, in every 
state to perform reliability calculations.  The focus of the analysis is centered on the 
following three main points: 
1) Identification of elements that failures are non-recoverable, 
2) Identification of the most abundant elements in a design, 
3) Identification of the least radiation tolerant elements. 
Failures in microelectronic devices can be classified into the following categories: 
recoverable, non-recoverable, and transparent.  The most catastrophic failure is the non-
recoverable case, which leads to permanent circuit damage.  Early identification of the 
elements and their sensitivity to the space environment effects that can cause non-
recoverable failures is paramount to a reliability determination.  Recoverable errors do 
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 not have the drastic effect of circuit damage, but can cause a decrease in circuit 
performance because of the time it takes for a circuit to recover.  Transparent failures of a 
device result in no noticeable effect to circuit performance or functionality.  These 
failures can be disregarded during circuit analysis. 
As discussed earlier, modern FPGAs have the built in functionality to be 
reprogrammed.  This is accomplished by rerouting the interconnect of the device.  Bits 
that direct both the data and control interconnect are stored in static random access 
memory (SRAM).  The SRAM’s output controls a pass transistor that acts like a switch 
for the interconnect, see Figure 8. These two elements have been demonstrated to be the 
leading cause of failure in SRAM based FPGAs [23].  The majority of SEEs in a FPGAs 
are considered recoverable or transient in nature and can be detected, then corrected 
through efficient programming of the device.  Failures or bit upsets in the configuration 
logic are not possible to detect through these methods though, and lead to errors that are  
not recoverable without a time consuming reset of the device. 
 
Figure 8.  SRAM controlling a pass transistor. 
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 The most widely used configuration storage structure in SRAM-based FPGAs is 
the six-transistor SRAM cell.  The configuration shown in Figure 9 is a representation of 
the SRAM cell used for the simulations in this work.  The SRAM consists of two cross-
coupled inverters that constantly refresh each other.  This continual refreshing of the 
stored bit makes the cell vulnerable to particle strikes.   
Bit_not
M1
Word
M5
M3
M2
M6
M4
Gnd
Bit
Vdd
A_notA
 
Figure 9.  Six Transistor SRAM cell [29]. 
The pass transistor portion of the configuration cell, though an integral part will 
not be addressed by this work.  This work focuses on the effects of non-ideal 
temperature, power, and particle strikes affecting the pn junction of the drain on a CMOS 
minimum-sized NMOS transistor and appropriately sized PMOS transistor that have 
equal rise and fall time delays.  A strike forming a channel between the gate and the body 
is the main weak spot for the pass transistor.  This phenomena will be discussed in future 
works.. 
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 Combinational logic is the cornerstone of data routing and manipulation in 
FPGAs.  It forms the multiplexers, as well as the logic to perform operations.  With the 
exception of TID effects, the majority of failures seen in combinational logic are 
transient.  The duration of these transient effects is investigated in simulation to 
determine effects on reliability 
Synchronous operation and temporary data storage are required by most 
applications.  The critical component of a FPGA that gives it the option to have this 
flexibility are flip-flops (FF).  The sensitivity of a FF to the space environment will not 
be discussed in this work, as it has already been addressed in prior works [24].  
3.4 Technique for Radiation Simulation 
The worst-case radiation effects to microelectronics in the space environment are 
caused by particles from GCR and CME.  These particles have extremely high energies, 
up to the GeV range, but low flux.  Many platforms never experience a strike of this 
magnitude [26].  The effects from these events must be addressed with mitigation.  As 
discussed earlier, if a device can be radiation hardened to handle 100 MeV proton strike, 
the device will be able to tolerate SEEs from other particles.  The energy transferred to 
the device as a particle passes through is directly related to the incident energy of the 
particle, the type of element, and the substrate material.  Figure 10 shows the energy 
absorbed by silicon per micrometer for different elements.  With the exception of 
krypton, which has a low instance rate in space, iron has the greatest stopping power of 
common elements at 100 MeV. 
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Figure 10.  Stopping power vs. different ions in silicon [30]. 
It is concluded that a proton strike at 100 MeV will be a comprehensive representation of 
likely particle strikes.  If the circuit tolerates the effects caused by this strike, it will be 
able to tolerate strikes by particles with lesser energies. 
 To simulate this strike using SPICE, a method was needed to mimic the behavior 
of the node in question.  As discussed earlier, when an ion penetrates the drain of a 
device, a temporary channel is formed by residual electron and hole pairs left in the 
material.  This will cause a momentary connection or funnel between the drain and the 
body of a MOSFET device.  Figure 7 shows the funnel created by the electron/hole pairs. 
This effect can be represented in SPICE as a current source on the node of the 
drain that has been penetrated by a particle.  Figure 11 is a transistor level representation 
of a particle strike on the drain of M5 in a SRAM cell. 
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Figure 11.  SRAM cell with current source injected to simulate particle strike. 
  The current source characteristics were developed using a model based on the 
Dorkel Model for estimating carrier mobilities in silicon [24], [25].  A graph of the 
magnitude of the current source used to simulate the proton strike is shown in Figure 12.  
There is a quick 100 ps spike, followed by an exponential decay of the current magnitude 
as the electron/hole pairs dissipate.  
 
Figure 12.  Current source representation of 100 MeV Fe proton strike. 
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 The current source is injected at states and nodes during the simulation when the 
effects will not be transparent.  For NMOS transistors on sensitive nodes, the current 
source is connected between the node and the body of transistor when the drain is at a 
positive voltage level.  For PMOS transistors on sensitive nodes, the current source is 
connected when the drain is at the reference voltage level (gnd).  These nodes and states 
will be different for each circuit of interest and are discussed in more detail later.   
The measure of a particle strikes effect on the reliability of an element is 
dependant on the function of the element.  For combinational logic, the amount of time 
that erroneous data is output is considered.  This effect can have significant effects on 
synchronous devices.  If the erroneous data propagation time is greater than the clock or 
setup/hold time of the next synchronous element in the signal path, the erroneous data 
may be latched and become permanent.  Asynchronous devices see little effect from this 
type of error.  Storage elements main criteria for failure is a ‘bit-flip’.  This is when the 
strike changes the value of the stored data.  The main criteria for failure for a 
synchronous device such as a FF is a state change.  The sudden current spike and change 
in potential on some nodes may cause the state of the FF to change. 
The inverter implemented in the simulations and shown in Figure 13 is vulnerable 
in two different states.   
27 
  
Figure 13.  Inverter cell [29]. 
The first vulnerable area is the drain of M1 when the input is a ‘1’.  The current 
source discussed earlier is applied for the specified period from the body of M1 (Vdd) to 
the OUT node.  The other vulnerable area is the drain of M2 when the input is ‘0’.  To 
simulate the effect using SPICE, the current source was injected from the body of M2 to 
the OUT node.  To determine the impact on reliability, the time the difference of the out 
node of the load circuit’s voltage level and supply voltage was more than 50% of the 
supply voltage level was measured. 
There are three main areas of the implemented NAND gate in Figure 14 that when 
hit with a proton strike, the effects will not be transparent.  The three areas are the drain 
of M1 or M2, the drain of M3, and the node MIDN.  The drain of M1 or M2 is 
susceptible when both IN1 and IN2 are ‘1’.  The momentary channel formed will create a 
path between the drain of M1 or M2 and the body of the PMOS transistor that is at Vdd.  
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 When the inputs to the NAND gate are at IN1 = ‘0’ and IN2 = ‘1’, the drain of node 
MIDN is a point of interest.  For a short period, current will flow from the OUT node, 
through M3, and to the body of the NMOS along the path created by the electron hole 
pairs that are left behind by the proton strike.  The last vulnerable area is the drain of M3.  
Anytime IN1 is ‘0’ or IN2 is ‘0’ and there is a particle strike to the drain of M3, there is a 
possibility of wrong output values on the OUT node.  To determine the impact on 
reliability, the time the difference of the out node of the load circuit’s voltage level and 
supply voltage was more than 50% of the supply voltage level was measured. 
 
Figure 14.  NAND gate [29]. 
 
 The technique for simulating a 100 MeV iron proton strike on a XOR gate is 
similar to that of the NAND gate with the exception of more vulnerable areas.  The 
implementation of the XOR gate can be seen in Figure 15 with all nodes labeled. 
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Figure 15.  XOR gate [29]. 
The XOR gate has a total of eight vulnerable states and nodes that will have transient 
effects on the output.  The eight states and nodes of interest are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5.  States of interest for XOR proton strike simulation. 
Strike Location IN1 IN2 Current Direction 
Node MIDP1 Vdd Vdd Vdd to MIDP1 
Node MIDP2 Gnd Gnd Vdd to MIDP2 
Node MIDN1 Gnd Vdd MIDN1 to Gnd 
Node MIDN2 Vdd Gnd MIDN2 to Gnd 
Drain of M2 Gnd Gnd Vdd to OUT 
Drain of M4 Vdd Vdd Vdd to OUT 
Drain of M5 Vdd Gnd OUT to Gnd 
Drain of M7 Gnd Vdd OUT to Gnd 
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 The results of a proton strike on nodes that have the same transistor characteristics and 
paths from their source to the output will be the same.  This allows the reduction of the 
number of states to simulate to four: drain of a PMOS transistor on the OUT node, drain 
of a NMOS transistor on the OUT node, a MID node in the PMOS portion of the XOR, 
and a MID node in NMOS portion of the XOR.  Like the other combinational logic tested 
in this work, the time the strike effects the output of the next circuit in the load is 
measured.  The measurement is performed for the time the output of the next circuit in 
the load is greater than 50 % of the supply voltage for low to high effects and less than 50 
% of the supply voltage for high to low effects. 
 A six-transistor SRAM cell has similar vulnerable states.  The SRAM cell shown 
in Figure 9 is representative of the cell used in the configuration logic of many FPGAs.  
The main states of interest for proton strike simulations are the ones that will disrupt the 
stored value temporarily or even permanently change its value.  The states where this is 
possible are listed in Table 6. 
Table 6.  States of interest for SRAM ion strike simulation 
Strike Location Stored Value Current Direction 
Drain of M1 Vdd A to Gnd 
Drain of M3 Vdd A to Gnd 
Drain of M5 Gnd Vdd to A 
Drain of M2 Gnd Vdd to A 
Drain of M4 Gnd Vdd to A 
Drain of M6 Vdd A to Gnd 
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 Strikes at the drain of M1 and at the drain of M3 will have similar effects.  This is 
also true for strikes at the drain of M2 and drain of M4.  Due to the strikes having the 
same effect on the circuit, only one of each case was simulated as representative of the 
strike. 
3.5 Technique for Temperature and Non-Ideal Power Simulations 
As discussed earlier, MOSFET devices are very sensitive to non-ideal 
temperature and supply voltage levels.  The expected operating conditions for COTS 
FPGAs is room temperature with an ideal supply voltage.  Tolerances are built into 
devices to handle normal variations in the environment.  Microelectronic devices are 
fabricated with commercial, industrial, and military standards.  The specific ranges of 
these temperatures are shown in Table 7.  Microelectronics in the space environment 
have a normal operating temperature of -35◦C to 60◦C, but the defense supply center 
states that in worst-case conditions, system developers should plan for a temperature 
range between -40◦C to 90◦C [37].  Simulations were performed using the -40◦C to 90◦C 
range based on the recommendation. 
Table 7.  Operating temperature standards for microelectronic devices. 
Commercial Industrial MIL-PRF-38535 [37]
0◦C  to 70◦C -40◦C  to 85◦C -55◦C  to 125◦C 
 
The Virtex family of FPGAs have a recommend internal supply voltage range of 
5 %.  Studies from NASA have indicated a non-ideal supply voltage over time due to 
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 factors listed in Chapter 2.  Because of this, reliability simulations were performed using 
a supply voltage range from 70 % to 130 % of nominal. 
The NAND gate shown in Figure 14 has three states of interest to both power and 
temperature simulations.  The first state is when both NMOS transistors are allowing 
current to flow due to a ‘1’ being applied to both the inputs, which leads to a ‘0’ on the 
output.  To determine the effect on delay of both temperature and power in this state, the 
inputs IN1 and IN2 were both initially set to ‘0’.  After .5 ns, both inputs were increased 
to the supply voltage level with a rise time of .07 ns and held there for 1.59 ns.  Both the 
rise time and period were estimated from data listed in the Xilinx publications 
[11],[15],[19].  Propagation delay measurements where then performed using the 
measure function in SPICE.  Measurements were started when IN1 was at 50 % of the 
supply voltage and completed when OUT was equal to 50 % of the supply voltage.  The 
next state is when either of the PMOS transistors have a channel formed from source to 
drain due to a ‘0’ being applied to either inputs.  The same technique that was utilized to 
measure the propagation delay for the first state is used with minor changes due to the 0 
to 1 transition.  The final state of interest is when both PMOS transistors have channels 
formed from their source to drain.  Simulations are run for each of these three states 
sweeping the power and supply voltage levels for each.  The delay is recorded for each 
temperature and supply power level to demonstrate the effects. 
The techniques used for simulation of the XOR gate shown in Figure 15 to 
demonstrate effects of non-ideal temperature and power are the same techniques that 
were used for the NAND gate.  The differences are in the states that are of interest to this 
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 work.  The first state of interest is when both inputs are initially at ‘0’; this leads to a ‘0’ 
on the output.  Either of the inputs are then changed to the supply voltage level to force a 
low-to-high transition on the output.  The propagation delay is then measured.  The two 
other states follow the same basic method, but are looking at a high-to-low transition on 
the OUT node.  To achieve a starting condition of a high value on the output, IN1 and 
IN2 are stimulated with opposite values.  After 0.5 ns, both inputs are made high for the 
second state and both inputs are forced low for the last state. 
To characterize the changes in behavior of the SRAM cell in Figure 9 due to non-
ideal supply voltage and extreme temperature operating conditions simulations were 
performed.  After analysis of the cell, only two states required simulations.  The delay 
was measured on the output of the load circuit during both a low-to-high and high-to-low 
transition.  These simulations were repeated for all temperature and voltage ranges 
discussed earlier.  
3.6 Comprehensive Simulation Technique to Determine Reliability 
Each of the simulation techniques discussed earlier focus on one area that could 
cause a disruption or failure in critical portions of CMOS circuits.  To determine 
reliability, the simulation method shown in Figure 16 was used.  It combined simulations 
for non-ideal power, extreme temperatures, and particle strikes to sensitive portions of a 
circuit.  For example, a proton strike on a sensitive node will have a greater effect on a 
circuit when the supply voltage has dropped by 30 % and temperature has dropped below 
0 ◦C. 
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Figure 16.  Simulation flow chart. 
The developed method first establishes a baseline of operation for the circuits of 
interest by determining propagation delays for significant transitions at ideal temperature 
and voltage levels.  For the purpose of this work, ideal temperature is considered 25 ◦C.  
Ideal voltage is considered 1.5 V for 130 nm, 1.2V for 90 nm, and 1 V for 65 nm feature 
sizes.  The next step is to cycle through each supply voltage level.  For the purpose of this 
work, a voltage range of ±30 % was determined to be within the tolerances of popular 
COTS FPGAs and the possible conditions a microelectronic device in the space 
environment might be expected to operate under.  Now that a baseline effect has been 
determined for non-ideal supply voltages, simulation across the range of temperatures is 
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 performed.  As discussed earlier, microelectronics in the space environment are expected 
to operate at temperatures between -40 ◦C and 90 ◦C.  When the performance of the 
circuit in question has been determined for each temperature at each voltage level, the 
next step is to simulate a 100 MeV Fe proton strike at critical nodes.  If the circuit can 
tolerate a strike by a iron proton at this energy, the circuit will be able to tolerate all but 
the most extreme and rare electron, neutron, ion, and proton strikes a electronic device 
might encounter in LEO or MEO orbits.  This technique goes beyond just determining 
the impacts of a strike on a critical node, by determining the impacts of a strike with both 
temperature and supply voltage variations.  Each sensitive node and state of the circuit is 
simulated at each supply voltage and each temperature in the range.  This method gives a 
clear picture of any elements performance in the space environment. 
3.7 Failure Rate Calculations 
 To determine the reliability of a microelectronic device in the space environment 
the number of failures over time is calculated for different common orbits.  The generic 
equation for failure rate of an element in this work is 
 p p n nflux (n area n area ) Nλ = ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅  (7) 
where l is in failures/s, flux is in protons/(cm-2s-1), np is the number of sensitive PMOS 
nodes in a element, areap is the sensitive area on a PMOS transistor, nn is the number of 
sensitive NMOS nodes in a element, arean is the radiation sensitive area on a NMOS 
transistor, and N is the number of instances of the element in the circuit.  The flux, the 
number of particles passing through a given area over time, will vary for different orbits.   
36 
  Calculation of the total reliability is achieved by a summation of the reliabilities 
of each critical element as seen in the following equation 
 total element1 element 2 element3...λ λ λ λ= + +  (8) 
where lelement is the reliability of separate elements. 
3.8 Failure Criteria for Critical Elements of FPGA Models 
 It is possible for each element in a circuit to have separate criteria’s for failure.  
For the specific FPGAs modeled in these simulations, there are only three criteria for 
failure: propagation delay, bit-flip, and erroneous data propagation time.  For temperature 
and non-ideal supply voltage simulations of combinational logic, propagation delay is the 
measure used to determine reliability.  Propagation delay is compared to values listed in 
Table 8 to determine effects on reliability.  For particle strike simulations, the criterion 
for failure is the amount of time erroneous data is propagated from the output of the 
combinational element.  These measurements are then compared against the values in 
Table 8 to determine if a failure state has occurred.   
Table 8.  Propagation delay criteria for failure of FPGA Models. 
FPGA Virtex II Pro Virtex 4 Virtex 5 
Clock Min PW 0.37 ns 0.28 ns 0.35 ns 
Min Setup/Hold 0.21 ns 0.36 ns 0.36 ns 
 
 The main criterion for failure in a SRAM device is a ‘bit-flip’.  This occurs when 
the stored value permanently changes.  If a ‘bit-flip’ does not occur, the erroneous data 
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 propagation time is measured.  This is the time that the wrong value is output from the 
SRAM cell while it is recovering. 
3.9 Architecture Options to Increase Reliability 
When a developer designs a circuit, he is in a constant state of dilemma dealing 
with the engineering decisions or “trade-offs” that must be made to meet different project 
requirements.  This is even more of a factor for microelectronics deployed in the space 
environment.  Due to the expense of replacing a failed circuit, developers design for the 
highest reliability possible with less regard to cost (both in terms of area and dollars) and 
performance.   
Some common techniques are used to make a circuit more tolerant to particle 
strikes.  The first technique is to resize the transistors of the circuit.  By increasing the 
width of the diffusion area and maintaining the ratio of the PMOS to NMOS, a CMOS 
circuit will become less sensitive to radiation strikes.  This technique was used in 
simulations, but was limited to an increase of 10 % in the effective width of both the 
PMOS and NMOS transistors.  An increase of greater that 10 % was deemed to be to 
drastic a cost, and not representative of the technologies of interest to this work.  Mark 
Martin successfully used this method to create a radiation hardened triple mode 
redundant sense amplifying flip-flop (TMR-SAFF) [24]. 
Another common technique for use with SRAM cells is to make internal portions 
redundant [27].  This technique adds two more inverters (double the power and area), see 
Figure 17, but gives the SRAM cell the ability to recover and most often prevent ‘bit-
flips’ caused by particle strikes.  In the dual interlocked storage cell (DICE), every 
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 sensitive node is protected by two other nodes.  This architecture was only tested to 
demonstrate functionality of the concept on small feature sizes and was not run through 
the gambit of simulations the non-hardened circuits were.   
 
Figure 17.  DICE SRAM [27]. 
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 IV. Analysis and Results 
4.1 Overview 
This chapter will cover the following material: 
1) Performance of critical FPGA elements under temperature and non-ideal 
voltage simulations, 
2) Results of particle strike simulations, 
3) Reliability estimations of COTS FPGAs in the space environment, 
4) Simulation results of radiation hardened critical FPGA elements, 
5) A comparison of a COTS hardened and non-hardened FPGA. 
4.2 Non-Ideal Temperature and Supply Voltage Simulations  
 All critical configuration elements were simulated under every combination of 
temperature and supply voltage.  Propagation delay was measured to determine 
performance under these conditions.  Table 9 shows the largest propagation delay 
measured for each critical element.  None of the elements failed according to the criteria 
for failure listed in Table 8.  The worst-case delays were observed during the same 
conditions for each device, minimum supply voltage and maximum temperature.   
Table 9.  Maximum propagation delays for temperature and voltage simulations. 
Feature Size NAND XOR INV SRAM 
130 nm 38.9 ps 79.6 ps 39.6 ps 42.2 ps
90 nm 39.9 ps 80.1 ps 40.1 ps 50.0 ps
65 nm 42.2 ps 80.3 ps 41.0 ps 50.0 ps
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Figure 18 shows the propagation delay increasing with temperature and 
decreasing with changes in supply voltage for all three versions of the NAND gate with a 
1-to-0 transition.  This expected trend is seen on each device.  Each ‘tooth’ in the graph 
represents simulations taken at a constant temperature, over the full range of supply 
voltage levels.  Temperature values start at -40 ◦C, and increase in increments of 5 ◦C for 
each ‘tooth’. 
NAND Worst Case
0.00E+00
5.00E-12
1.00E-11
1.50E-11
2.00E-11
2.50E-11
3.00E-11
3.50E-11
4.00E-11
4.50E-11
1 16 31 46 61 76 91 106 121 136 151 166 181 196 211 226 241 256 271
Run
Pr
op
ag
at
io
n 
D
el
ay
(s
ec
)
tdlay 65
tdlay 90
tdlay 130
 
Figure 18.  Effect on propagation delay of supply voltage and temperature. 
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 4.3 Particle Strike Simulations 
 A proton strike with an energy of 100 MeV was simulated using SPICE for all 
critical elements in the configuration logic of the FPGA models.  With the exception of 
the inverter, simulations of the strike on all the combinational logic elements at all 
temperature and voltage levels had the same result, failure to meet the manufactures noise 
tolerances found in Table 8.  The largest erroneous data times can be found in Table 10.  
It is shown that as feature size decreases, the erroneous data propagation times will 
increase.  This demonstrates the reduction of radiation tolerance in smaller feature-sized 
devices.  Simulations on the SRAM cell resulted in a ‘bit-flip’ for every iteration of the 
simulation.   
Table 10.  Maximum erroneous propagation times for critical configuration elements. 
Feature Size NAND XOR INV SRAM
130 nm 1.07 ns 1.445 ns 0 ns Bit-flip
90 nm 1.08 ns 1.519 ns 0 ns Bit flip
65 nm 1.66 ns 1.782 ns 0 ns Bit flip
 
4.4 COTS FPGA Reliability Estimations 
 Predictions of reliability of the FPGAs modeled were centered on the 
performance of the configuration structure of the devices.  The only non-recoverable 
failure observed in the configuration structure of the device was the bit-flips of the 
SRAM elements.   
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 Reliability estimations were calculated using SPICE models, equation (7), and 
manufactures data from Table 3 and Table 4.  The arean and areap variables in equation(7) 
were calculated using parameters extracted from the SPICE NMOS and PMOS models in 
the following equation 
 drain
Larea W 3
2
⎛ ⎞= + ⋅⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (9) 
where area is the radiation sensitive area in cm2, Wdrain is the width of the channel, and L 
is the length of the channel.  To determine the depth, common design rules were used 
from [1] that stated the depth of the drain active area was 
 draindepth 3 lambda= ⋅  (10) 
where depth is in cm, and lambda is half the channel length, L.  The number of instances 
of the SRAM configuration cell in each device is found in the number of configuration 
bits listed in Table 3 and Table 4.   
 The first set of reliability estimations, see Table 11, are based on a worst-case 
orbit at the edge of the trapped proton belt.  From the AP-8 model we use a 105 m-2s-1  
flux [34].  Since this is the worst case, the following assumptions were integrated with 
the reliability calculation: proton strikes are evenly distributed across the die and that 100 
% of the configuration bits were being used.  The results of these calculations showed a 
massive number of failures per second.  This is an unusual set of conditions and is not 
representative of an average mission.   
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 Table 11.  Failure rates for worst case orbit. 
14,820 
failures/sec50,811,1360.292 mm2105 ions cm-2s-190 nm
Virtex 4
XC4VFX140
1,458 
failures/sec5,000,0000.292 mm2105 ions cm-2s-190 nm
Virtex 4
XC4VLX15
6,998 
failures/sec24,000,0000.292 mm2105 ions cm-2s-190 nm
Virtex 4
XC4VSX55
1,271 
failures/sec8,000,0000.152 mm2105 ions cm-2s-165 nm
Virtex 5
XC5VLX30
20,860 
failures/sec34,292,7680.608 mm2105 ions cm-2s-1130 nm
Virtex II Pro
XC2VP100
4,715 
failures/sec 31,000,0000.152 mm2105 ions cm-2s-165 nm
Virtex 5
XC5VLX110T
790 
failures/sec1,300,0000.608 mm2105 ions cm-2s-1130 nm
Virtex II Pro
XC2VP2
12,580 
failures/sec82,696,1920.152 mm2105 ions cm-2s-165 nm
Virtex 5
XC5VLX330T
7,301 
failures/sec12,000,0000.608 mm2105 ions cm-2s-1130 nm
Virtex II Pro
XC2VP40
Failure 
Rate
Number of 
Elements
SRAM 
Sensitive 
Node AreaIon Flux
Channel 
LengthDevice
 
 The next three simulation orbits are considered common.  The simulations were 
performed with more realistic assumptions of proton strike distribution and configuration 
bit usage.  For these calculations, 66% of the particles were assumed to strike the cross 
section of the device individually.  This leads to a reduction of the flux by a third.  
According to observed data from [40] Virtex FPGAs average usage of configuration bits 
is 25 % of the total number of configuration bits.  Using this observation, the number of 
sensitive elements in equation (7) was reduced by 75%.   
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  The results of reliability calculations for a LEO is shown in Table 12.  The LEO 
orbit used for this set of calculations was a 400 km circular orbit at an inclination of 
51.6%.  The LEO polar orbit, results in Table 13, was an 800 km circular orbit at an 
inclination of 98 %.  Seen in Table 14 are the results of the elliptical MEO orbit of 2000 
km x 26,570 km at an inclination of 63.4 %.  Due to the lower proton flux at LEO orbits 
described in Chapter 2, the failure rate is reduced.  It is shown that the more configuration 
bits, the higher the failure rate.  This data shows that COTS are not reliable in space. 
Table 12.  LEO failure rate estimations. 
1.589 
failures/sec12,702,7840.292 mm265 ions cm-2s-190 nm
Virtex 4
XC4VFX140
0.156 
failures/sec1,250,0000.292 mm265 ions cm-2s-190 nm
Virtex 4
XC4VLX15
0.751 
failures/sec6,000,0000.292 mm265 ions cm-2s-190 nm
Virtex 4
XC4VSX55
0.131 
failures/sec2,000,0000.152 mm265 ions cm-2s-165 nm
Virtex 5
XC5VLX30
2.238 
failures/sec8,573,1920.608 mm265 ions cm-2s-1130 nm
Virtex II Pro
XC2VP100
0.506 
failures/sec 7,750,0000.152 mm265 ions cm-2s-165 nm
Virtex 5
XC5VLX110T
0.085 
failures/sec325,0000.608 mm265 ions cm-2s-1130 nm
Virtex II Pro
XC2VP2
1.349 
failures/sec20,674,0480.152 mm265 ions cm-2s-165 nm
Virtex 5
XC5VLX330T
0.783 
failures/sec3,000,0000.608 mm265 ions cm-2s-1130 nm
Virtex II Pro
XC2VP40
Failure 
Rate
Number of 
Elements
SRAM 
Sensitive 
Node AreaIon Flux
Channel 
LengthDevice
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 Table 13.  LEO polar failure rate estimations. 
0.13 
failures/sec12,702,7840.292 mm25.3 ions cm-2s-190 nm
Virtex 4
XC4VFX140
0.013 
failures/sec1,250,0000.292 mm25.3 ions cm-2s-190 nm
Virtex 4
XC4VLX15
0.061 
failures/sec6,000,0000.292 mm25.3 ions cm-2s-190 nm
Virtex 4
XC4VSX55
0.011 
failures/sec2,000,0000.152 mm25.3 ions cm-2s-165 nm
Virtex 5
XC5VLX30
0.182 
failures/sec8,573,1920.608 mm25.3 ions cm-2s-1130 nm
Virtex II Pro
XC2VP100
0.041 
failures/sec 7,750,0000.152 mm25.3 ions cm-2s-165 nm
Virtex 5
XC5VLX110T
0.007 
failures/sec325,0000.608 mm25.3 ions cm-2s-1130 nm
Virtex II Pro
XC2VP2
0.11 
failures/sec20,674,0480.152 mm25.3 ions cm-2s-165 nm
Virtex 5
XC5VLX330T
0.064 
failures/sec3,000,0000.608 mm25.3 ions cm-2s-1130 nm
Virtex II Pro
XC2VP40
Failure 
Rate
Number of 
Elements
SRAM 
Sensitive 
Node AreaIon Flux
Channel 
LengthDevice
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 Table 14.  MEO elliptical failure rate estimations. 
7.09 
failures/sec12,702,7840.292 mm2290 ions cm-2s-190 nm
Virtex 4
XC4VFX140
0.68 
failures/sec1,250,0000.292 mm2290 ions cm-2s-190 nm
Virtex 4
XC4VLX15
3.349 
failures/sec6,000,0000.292 mm2290 ions cm-2s-190 nm
Virtex 4
XC4VSX55
0.582 
failures/sec2,000,0000.152 mm2290 ions cm-2s-165 nm
Virtex 5
XC5VLX30
9.983 
failures/sec8,573,1920.608 mm2290 ions cm-2s-1130 nm
Virtex II Pro
XC2VP100
2.256 
failures/sec 7,750,0000.152 mm2290 ions cm-2s-165 nm
Virtex 5
XC5VLX110T
0.378 
failures/sec325,0000.608 mm2290 ions cm-2s-1130 nm
Virtex II Pro
XC2VP2
6.019 
failures/sec20,674,0480.152 mm2290 ions cm-2s-165 nm
Virtex 5
XC5VLX330T
3.493 
failures/sec3,000,0000.608 mm2290 ions cm-2s-1130 nm
Virtex II Pro
XC2VP40
Failure 
Rate
Number of 
Elements
SRAM 
Sensitive 
Node AreaIon Flux
Channel 
LengthDevice
 
4.5 Implementation of Radiation Hardened Options Results 
 Functional simulations were performed on two different radiation hardened 
versions of the configuration SRAM cell with differing results.  These simulations were 
performed using worst-case conditions, high temperature and low voltage, to reduce the 
number of simulations and determine functionality.   
 The first option explored was an increase to the width of the transistors.  This has 
been demonstrated in prior works to increase the radiation tolerance of CMOS devices 
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 [8], [24], [27].  Transistors ratios were maintained while manually increasing the widths 
up to 10 % of their original size.  This increase had no effect on the SRAM cell’s ability 
to prevent or recover from a 100 MeV proton strike.   
 The second option explored was the DICE implementation discussed earlier.  This 
implementation of the SRAM cell was able to quickly recover from radiation strikes with 
no loss of data.  The draw backs to this implementation are twice the power consumption 
and die area used.  With the high number of configuration bits in modern small feature-
sized FPGAs, it would be inefficient to utilize this architecture. 
4.6 Reliability Comparison of Radiation Hardened Versus COTS FPGA  
 Xilinx has implemented a radiation hardened FPGA (XCV1000) using older 
technology to try and reach the military and space electronics market.  This FPGA is 
comparable in performance and structure to the Virtex II Pro XC2VP40 [11], [42].  The 
main difference that applies to space reliability calculations between the two is the proton 
strike sensitive cross section.  Table 15 lists the parameters used and results for reliability 
calculations. 
Table 15.  XCV1000 failure rates for different common orbits. 
9.7x10-6 failures/sec1,532,0002.2x10-14 cm2290 ions cm-2s-1220 nmMEO elliptical
1.7x10-7 failures/sec1,532,0002.2x10-14 cm25.3 ions cm-2s-1220 nmLEO Polar
0.0034 failures/sec1,532,0002.2x10-14 cm2105 ions cm-2s-1220 nmWorst Case
2.2x10-6 failures/sec1,532,0002.2x10-14 cm265 ions cm-2s-1220 nmLEO
Failure Rate
Number of 
ElementsCross sectionIon Flux
Channel 
LengthOrbit
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  Figure 19 is a comparison of the failure rates for these two FPGAs at different 
orbits.  The reliability difference is extreme, up to six orders of magnitude.  Another point 
the graph makes, is that even the radiation hardened FPGA will have significant failure 
rates under worst-case conditions. 
Comparison of XCV1000 and XC2VP40 Failure Rates
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Figure 19.  Comparison of COTS hardened and non-hardened FPGAs failure rates. 
 Table 16 shows the comparison of failure rates for three different COTS FPGAs.  
The first two, XCV1000 and XC2VP40, failure rates were calculated using the method 
described in this work.  The failure rates for the XQVR300 are the results for two 
common orbits form lab experimentation [40].  The results of the two radiation hardened 
versions are similar, but differ due to assumptions in the failure rate calculations.  The 
published failure rates listed assume all configuration bits are being used with ideal 
temperature and voltage levels.  The published results also use the CHIME space 
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 radiation model, as compared to this work using the AP-8 space radiation model.  This 
skews the data slightly, with only a minimal difference in failure rates for the two 
radiation hardened FPGAs. 
Table 16.  Experimental failure rates versus simulated for LEO and MEO. 
Orbit 
XC2VP40 
Failures/Day
XCV1000 
Failures/Day
XQVR300 
Failures/Day
LEO 293,760 0.19 2.05 
MEO 67,651 0.838 2.35 
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 V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Overview 
This chapter contains the following: 
1) Conclusions of the research, 
2) A discussion on future works. 
5.2 Conclusions of Research 
The ability to efficiently characterize a system’s reliability is of paramount 
importance prior to deployment into the space environment.  To determine this reliability, 
key components must be identified and tested.  This methodology was migrated to the 
microelectronics level to provide designers a simple and efficient early reliability 
determination.  Characterization of the space environment was shown to have three major 
factors that can cause non-recoverable effects in microelectronics: non-ideal power, 
environmental temperature, and particle strikes.  A simulation technique that used 
common tools was developed to submit determined critical portions of a circuit to 
expected operating conditions when deployed in the space environment.  The failure rate 
results were similar to those obtained through previous experimental testing [40].  
Utilizing these techniques allows a developer to repair problem areas or readdress design 
limits prior to fabrication of the device.   
These techniques were demonstrated by determining the reliability of a modern 
COTS FPGA in the space environment.  After critical portions of the FPGAs were 
identified, models were generated of these portions using standard to cutting edge 
technologies.  These critical portions were then submitted to a battery of conditions and 
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 effects that represent the space environment.  The results of the simulations were as 
expected.  All three versions of the FPGA we deemed unreliable due to the configuration 
SRAM failing all conditions for a worst-case particle strike.   
Some of the modifications to the generic SRAM cells used showed increased 
reliability.  Implementation of the DICE architecture showed a 100% tolerance to particle 
strikes at sensitive areas while in a static state.  The cost/benefit analysis of doubling both 
power and footprint of the circuit element must be considered before this can be 
considered a viable alternative architecture.  It was proposed and tested that modifying 
the effective widths of the sensitive transistors in the SRAM would lead to greater 
particle strike tolerance.  Simulation results still gave a 100% failure rate for SRAM cells 
with the increased widths. 
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
 The research and techniques discussed in this work are the building blocks for 
many other avenues of research in to FPGA reliability in the space environment.  New 
tools are available to expand the simulation technique to from SPICE to three-
dimensional simulations utilizing Technology Computer Aided Design (TCAD).  This 
tool will allow the researcher to build simulated data for analysis to include radiation 
strikes from multiple incident angles.  This will be a more representative simulation of 
the space environment, and not just the worst-case simulations performed by SPICE.   
 With the data obtained using these simulations a full logic block can be built and 
tested.  This will allow for the development of radiation hardened circuits that are proven 
prior to tape-out.  With a proven design, future researchers will be able to fabricate their 
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 53 
circuit and submit the circuit to physical tests that will demonstrate the effectiveness of 
the simulation techniques. 
 Slight modifications of the radiation characterization will allow future researchers 
to expand the scope of simulations.  Anti-tampering researchers will have the ability to 
test the tolerance of key portions of an FPGA to common reverse engineering techniques.  
This will allow the fabrication of a more secure processing device for military 
applications.  The researchers will first need to characterize the methods used to stimulate 
transistors, then apply this characterization to the simulation technique. 
 Further modifications can determine hardness in terms of electronic warfare.  
Researchers can characterize the environment to determine the reliability of designed 
FPGAs to possible wartime conditions.  This will give the war-fighter consistent and 
reliable processing for many applications. 
 
 Appendix A SPICE 130 nm Transistor Models 
* 130nm NMOS 
 
.model  nmos  nmos  level = 54 
+version = 4.0    binunit = 1    paramchk= 1    mobmod  = 0 
+capmod  = 2      igcmod  = 1    igbmod  = 1    geomod  = 1 
+diomod  = 1      rdsmod  = 0    rbodymod= 1    rgatemod= 1 
+permod  = 1      acnqsmod= 0    trnqsmod= 0 
* parameters related to the technology node 
+tnom = 27    epsrox = 3.9 
+eta0 = 0.0092    nfactor = 1.5    wint = 5e-09 
+cgso = 2.4e-10    cgdo = 2.4e-10    xl = -6e-08 
* parameters customized by the user 
+toxe = 2.25e-09    toxp = 1.6e-09    toxm = 2.25e-09    toxref = 2.25e-09 
+dtox = 6.5e-10    lint = 1.05e-08 
+vth0 = 0.4    k1 = 0.485    u0 = 0.05767    vsat = 100370 
+rdsw = 200    ndep = 1.67e+18    xj = 3.92e-08 
* secondary parameters 
+ll      = 0            wl      = 0            lln     = 1            wln     = 1           
+lw      = 0            ww      = 0            lwn     = 1            wwn     = 1           
+lwl     = 0            wwl     = 0            xpart   = 0                
+k2      = 0.01         k3      = 0           
+k3b     = 0            w0      = 2.5e-006     dvt0    = 1            dvt1    = 2        
+dvt2    = -0.032       dvt0w   = 0            dvt1w   = 0            dvt2w   = 0           
+dsub    = 0.1          minv    = 0.05         voffl   = 0            dvtp0   = 1.0e-009      
+dvtp1   = 0.1          lpe0    = 0            lpeb    = 0                
+ngate   = 2e+020       nsd     = 2e+020       phin    = 0           
+cdsc    = 0.000        cdscb   = 0            cdscd   = 0            cit     = 0           
+voff    = -0.13        etab    = 0           
+vfb     = -0.55        ua      = 6e-010       ub      = 1.2e-018      
+uc      = 0            a0      = 1.0          ags     = 1e-020      
+a1      = 0            a2      = 1.0          b0      = 0            b1      = 0           
+keta    = 0.04         dwg     = 0            dwb     = 0            pclm    = 0.04        
+pdiblc1 = 0.001        pdiblc2 = 0.001        pdiblcb = -0.005       drout   = 0.5         
+pvag    = 1e-020       delta   = 0.01         pscbe1  = 8.14e+008    pscbe2  = 1e-007      
+fprout  = 0.2          pdits   = 0.08         pditsd  = 0.23         pditsl  = 2.3e+006    
+rsh     = 5            rsw     = 85           rdw     = 85         
+rdswmin = 0            rdwmin  = 0            rswmin  = 0            prwg    = 0           
+prwb    = 6.8e-011     wr      = 1            alpha0  = 0.074        alpha1  = 0.005       
+beta0   = 30           agidl   = 0.0002       bgidl   = 2.1e+009     cgidl   = 0.0002      
+egidl   = 0.8           
+aigbacc = 0.012        bigbacc = 0.0028       cigbacc = 0.002      
+nigbacc = 1            aigbinv = 0.014        bigbinv = 0.004        cigbinv = 0.004       
+eigbinv = 1.1          nigbinv = 3            aigc    = 0.012        bigc    = 0.0028      
+cigc    = 0.002        aigsd   = 0.012        bigsd   = 0.0028       cigsd   = 0.002      
+nigc    = 1            poxedge = 1            pigcd   = 1            ntox    = 1           
+xrcrg1  = 12           xrcrg2  = 5           
+cgbo    = 2.56e-011    cgdl    = 2.653e-10      
+cgsl    = 2.653e-10    ckappas = 0.03         ckappad = 0.03         acde    = 1           
+moin    = 15           noff    = 0.9          voffcv  = 0.02        
+kt1     = -0.11        kt1l    = 0            kt2     = 0.022        ute     = -1.5        
+ua1     = 4.31e-009    ub1     = 7.61e-018    uc1     = -5.6e-011    prt     = 0           
+at      = 33000       
+fnoimod = 1            tnoimod = 0           
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 +jss     = 0.0001       jsws    = 1e-011       jswgs   = 1e-010       njs     = 1           
+ijthsfwd= 0.01         ijthsrev= 0.001        bvs     = 10           xjbvs   = 1           
+jsd     = 0.0001       jswd    = 1e-011       jswgd   = 1e-010       njd     = 1           
+ijthdfwd= 0.01         ijthdrev= 0.001        bvd     = 10           xjbvd   = 1           
+pbs     = 1            cjs     = 0.0005       mjs     = 0.5          pbsws   = 1           
+cjsws   = 5e-010       mjsws   = 0.33         pbswgs  = 1            cjswgs  = 3e-010      
+mjswgs  = 0.33         pbd     = 1            cjd     = 0.0005       mjd     = 0.5         
+pbswd   = 1            cjswd   = 5e-010       mjswd   = 0.33         pbswgd  = 1           
+cjswgd  = 5e-010       mjswgd  = 0.33         tpb     = 0.005        tcj     = 0.001       
+tpbsw   = 0.005        tcjsw   = 0.001        tpbswg  = 0.005        tcjswg  = 0.001       
+xtis    = 3            xtid    = 3           
+dmcg    = 0e-006       dmci    = 0e-006       dmdg    = 0e-006       dmcgt   = 0e-007      
+dwj     = 0.0e-008     xgw     = 0e-007       xgl     = 0e-008      
+rshg    = 0.4          gbmin   = 1e-010       rbpb    = 5            rbpd    = 15          
+rbps    = 15           rbdb    = 15           rbsb    = 15           ngcon   = 1           
 
* Customized  130nm PMOS 
 
.model  pmos  pmos  level = 54 
 
+version = 4.0    binunit = 1    paramchk= 1    mobmod  = 0 
+capmod  = 2      igcmod  = 1    igbmod  = 1    geomod  = 1 
+diomod  = 1      rdsmod  = 0    rbodymod= 1    rgatemod= 1 
+permod  = 1      acnqsmod= 0    trnqsmod= 0 
* parameters related to the technology node 
+tnom = 27    epsrox = 3.9 
+eta0 = 0.0092    nfactor = 1.5    wint = 5e-09 
+cgso = 2.4e-10    cgdo = 2.4e-10    xl = -6e-08 
* parameters customized by the user 
+toxe = 2.35e-09    toxp = 1.6e-09    toxm = 2.35e-09    toxref = 2.35e-09 
+dtox = 7.5e-10    lint = 1.05e-08 
+vth0 = -0.349    k1 = 0.443    u0 = 0.0077    vsat = 70000 
+rdsw = 240    ndep = 1.28e+18    xj = 3.92e-08 
*secondary parameters 
+ll      = 0            wl      = 0            lln     = 1            wln     = 1           
+lw      = 0            ww      = 0            lwn     = 1            wwn     = 1           
+lwl     = 0            wwl     = 0            xpart   = 0                
+k2      = -0.01        k3      = 0           
+k3b     = 0            w0      = 2.5e-006     dvt0    = 1            dvt1    = 2        
+dvt2    = -0.032       dvt0w   = 0            dvt1w   = 0            dvt2w   = 0           
+dsub    = 0.1          minv    = 0.05         voffl   = 0            dvtp0   = 1e-009      
+dvtp1   = 0.05         lpe0    = 0            lpeb    = 0                
+ngate   = 2e+020       nsd     = 2e+020       phin    = 0           
+cdsc    = 0.000        cdscb   = 0            cdscd   = 0            cit     = 0           
+voff    = -0.126       etab    = 0           
+vfb     = 0.55         ua      = 2.0e-009     ub      = 0.5e-018      
+uc      = 0            a0      = 1.0          ags     = 1e-020      
+a1      = 0            a2      = 1            b0      = -1e-020      b1      = 0           
+keta    = -0.047       dwg     = 0            dwb     = 0            pclm    = 0.12        
+pdiblc1 = 0.001        pdiblc2 = 0.001        pdiblcb = 3.4e-008     drout   = 0.56        
+pvag    = 1e-020       delta   = 0.01         pscbe1  = 8.14e+008    pscbe2  = 9.58e-007   
+fprout  = 0.2          pdits   = 0.08         pditsd  = 0.23         pditsl  = 2.3e+006    
+rsh     = 5            rsw     = 85           rdw     = 85         
+rdswmin = 0            rdwmin  = 0            rswmin  = 0            prwg    = 3.22e-008   
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 +prwb    = 6.8e-011     wr      = 1            alpha0  = 0.074        alpha1  = 0.005       
+beta0   = 30           agidl   = 0.0002       bgidl   = 2.1e+009     cgidl   = 0.0002      
+egidl   = 0.8           
+aigbacc = 0.012        bigbacc = 0.0028       cigbacc = 0.002      
+nigbacc = 1            aigbinv = 0.014        bigbinv = 0.004        cigbinv = 0.004       
+eigbinv = 1.1          nigbinv = 3            aigc    = 0.69         bigc    = 0.0012      
+cigc    = 0.0008       aigsd   = 0.0087       bigsd   = 0.0012       cigsd   = 0.0008      
+nigc    = 1            poxedge = 1            pigcd   = 1            ntox    = 1  
 +xrcrg1  = 12           xrcrg2  = 5           
+cgbo    = 2.56e-011    cgdl    = 2.653e-10 
+cgsl    = 2.653e-10    ckappas = 0.03         ckappad = 0.03         acde    = 1 
+moin    = 15           noff    = 0.9          voffcv  = 0.02 
+kt1     = -0.11        kt1l    = 0            kt2     = 0.022        ute     = -1.5        
+ua1     = 4.31e-009    ub1     = 7.61e-018    uc1     = -5.6e-011    prt     = 0           
+at      = 33000       
+fnoimod = 1            tnoimod = 0           
+jss     = 0.0001       jsws    = 1e-011       jswgs   = 1e-010       njs     = 1           
+ijthsfwd= 0.01         ijthsrev= 0.001        bvs     = 10           xjbvs   = 1           
+jsd     = 0.0001       jswd    = 1e-011       jswgd   = 1e-010       njd     = 1           
+ijthdfwd= 0.01         ijthdrev= 0.001        bvd     = 10           xjbvd   = 1           
+pbs     = 1            cjs     = 0.0005       mjs     = 0.5          pbsws   = 1           
+cjsws   = 5e-010       mjsws   = 0.33         pbswgs  = 1            cjswgs  = 3e-010      
+mjswgs  = 0.33         pbd     = 1            cjd     = 0.0005       mjd     = 0.5         
+pbswd   = 1            cjswd   = 5e-010       mjswd   = 0.33         pbswgd  = 1           
+cjswgd  = 5e-010       mjswgd  = 0.33         tpb     = 0.005        tcj     = 0.001       
+tpbsw   = 0.005        tcjsw   = 0.001        tpbswg  = 0.005        tcjswg  = 0.001       
+xtis    = 3            xtid    = 3           
+dmcg    = 0e-006       dmci    = 0e-006       dmdg    = 0e-006       dmcgt   = 0e-007      
+dwj     = 0.0e-008     xgw     = 0e-007       xgl     = 0e-008      
+rshg    = 0.4          gbmin   = 1e-010       rbpb    = 5            rbpd    = 15          
+rbps    = 15           rbdb    = 15           rbsb    = 15           ngcon   = 1           
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Appendix B SPICE 90 nm Transistor Models 
* Customized 90nm NMOS 
 
.model  nmos  nmos  level = 54 
 
+version = 4.0    binunit = 1    paramchk= 1    mobmod  = 0 
+capmod  = 2      igcmod  = 1    igbmod  = 1    geomod  = 1 
+diomod  = 1      rdsmod  = 0    rbodymod= 1    rgatemod= 1 
+permod  = 1      acnqsmod= 0    trnqsmod= 0 
* parameters related to the technology node 
+tnom = 27    epsrox = 3.9 
+eta0 = 0.0074    nfactor = 1.7    wint = 5e-09 
+cgso = 1.9e-10    cgdo = 1.9e-10    xl = -4e-08 
* parameters customized by the user 
+toxe = 2.05e-09    toxp = 1.4e-09    toxm = 2.05e-09    toxref = 2.05e-09 
+dtox = 6.5e-10    lint = 7.5e-09 
+vth0 = 0.408    k1 = 0.486    u0 = 0.05383    vsat = 113760 
+rdsw = 180    ndep = 2.02e+18    xj = 2.8e-08 
* secondary parameters 
+ll      = 0            wl      = 0            lln     = 1            wln     = 1           
+lw      = 0            ww      = 0            lwn     = 1            wwn     = 1           
+lwl     = 0            wwl     = 0            xpart   = 0                
+k2      = 0.01         k3      = 0           
+k3b     = 0            w0      = 2.5e-006     dvt0    = 1            dvt1    = 2        
+dvt2    = -0.032       dvt0w   = 0            dvt1w   = 0            dvt2w   = 0           
+dsub    = 0.1          minv    = 0.05         voffl   = 0            dvtp0   = 1.0e-009      
+dvtp1   = 0.1          lpe0    = 0            lpeb    = 0                
+ngate   = 2e+020       nsd     = 2e+020       phin    = 0           
+cdsc    = 0.000        cdscb   = 0            cdscd   = 0            cit     = 0           
+voff    = -0.13        etab    = 0           
+vfb     = -0.55        ua      = 6e-010       ub      = 1.2e-018      
+uc      = 0            a0      = 1.0          ags     = 1e-020      
+a1      = 0            a2      = 1.0          b0      = 0            b1      = 0           
+keta    = 0.04         dwg     = 0            dwb     = 0            pclm    = 0.04        
+pdiblc1 = 0.001        pdiblc2 = 0.001        pdiblcb = -0.005       drout   = 0.5         
+pvag    = 1e-020       delta   = 0.01         pscbe1  = 8.14e+008    pscbe2  = 1e-007      
+fprout  = 0.2          pdits   = 0.08         pditsd  = 0.23         pditsl  = 2.3e+006    
+rsh     = 5            rsw     = 85           rdw     = 85         
+rdswmin = 0            rdwmin  = 0            rswmin  = 0            prwg    = 0           
+prwb    = 6.8e-011     wr      = 1            alpha0  = 0.074        alpha1  = 0.005       
+beta0   = 30           agidl   = 0.0002       bgidl   = 2.1e+009     cgidl   = 0.0002      
+egidl   = 0.8           
+aigbacc = 0.012        bigbacc = 0.0028       cigbacc = 0.002      
+nigbacc = 1            aigbinv = 0.014        bigbinv = 0.004        cigbinv = 0.004       
+eigbinv = 1.1          nigbinv = 3            aigc    = 0.012        bigc    = 0.0028      
+cigc    = 0.002        aigsd   = 0.012        bigsd   = 0.0028       cigsd   = 0.002      
+nigc    = 1            poxedge = 1            pigcd   = 1            ntox    = 1           
+xrcrg1  = 12           xrcrg2  = 5           
+cgbo    = 2.56e-011    cgdl    = 2.653e-10      
+cgsl    = 2.653e-10    ckappas = 0.03         ckappad = 0.03         acde    = 1           
+moin    = 15           noff    = 0.9          voffcv  = 0.02        
+kt1     = -0.11        kt1l    = 0            kt2     = 0.022        ute     = -1.5        
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 +ua1     = 4.31e-009    ub1     = 7.61e-018    uc1     = -5.6e-011    prt     = 0           
+at      = 33000       
+fnoimod = 1            tnoimod = 0           
+jss     = 0.0001       jsws    = 1e-011       jswgs   = 1e-010       njs     = 1           
+ijthsfwd= 0.01         ijthsrev= 0.001        bvs     = 10           xjbvs   = 1           
+jsd     = 0.0001       jswd    = 1e-011       jswgd   = 1e-010       njd     = 1           
+ijthdfwd= 0.01         ijthdrev= 0.001        bvd     = 10           xjbvd   = 1           
+pbs     = 1            cjs     = 0.0005       mjs     = 0.5          pbsws   = 1           
+cjsws   = 5e-010       mjsws   = 0.33         pbswgs  = 1            cjswgs  = 3e-010      
+mjswgs  = 0.33         pbd     = 1            cjd     = 0.0005       mjd     = 0.5         
+pbswd   = 1            cjswd   = 5e-010       mjswd   = 0.33         pbswgd  = 1           
+cjswgd  = 5e-010       mjswgd  = 0.33         tpb     = 0.005        tcj     = 0.001       
+tpbsw   = 0.005        tcjsw   = 0.001        tpbswg  = 0.005        tcjswg  = 0.001       
+xtis    = 3            xtid    = 3           
+dmcg    = 0e-006       dmci    = 0e-006       dmdg    = 0e-006       dmcgt   = 0e-007      
+dwj     = 0.0e-008     xgw     = 0e-007       xgl     = 0e-008      
+rshg    = 0.4          gbmin   = 1e-010       rbpb    = 5            rbpd    = 15          
+rbps    = 15           rbdb    = 15           rbsb    = 15           ngcon   = 1           
 
* Customized PTM 90nm PMOS 
 
.model  pmos  pmos  level = 54 
 
+version = 4.0    binunit = 1    paramchk= 1    mobmod  = 0 
+capmod  = 2      igcmod  = 1    igbmod  = 1    geomod  = 1 
+diomod  = 1      rdsmod  = 0    rbodymod= 1    rgatemod= 1 
+permod  = 1      acnqsmod= 0    trnqsmod= 0 
* parameters related to the technology node 
+tnom = 27    epsrox = 3.9 
+eta0 = 0.0074    nfactor = 1.7    wint = 5e-09 
+cgso = 1.9e-10    cgdo = 1.9e-10    xl = -4e-08 
* parameters customized by the user 
+toxe = 2.15e-09    toxp = 1.4e-09    toxm = 2.15e-09    toxref = 2.15e-09 
+dtox = 7.5e-10    lint = 7.5e-09 
+vth0 = -0.356    k1 = 0.443    u0 = 0.00675    vsat = 70000 
+rdsw = 200    ndep = 1.53e+18    xj = 2.8e-08 
*secondary parameters 
+ll      = 0            wl      = 0            lln     = 1            wln     = 1           
+lw      = 0            ww      = 0            lwn     = 1            wwn     = 1           
+lwl     = 0            wwl     = 0            xpart   = 0                
+k2      = -0.01        k3      = 0           
+k3b     = 0            w0      = 2.5e-006     dvt0    = 1            dvt1    = 2        
+dvt2    = -0.032       dvt0w   = 0            dvt1w   = 0            dvt2w   = 0           
+dsub    = 0.1          minv    = 0.05         voffl   = 0            dvtp0   = 1e-009      
+dvtp1   = 0.05         lpe0    = 0            lpeb    = 0                
+ngate   = 2e+020       nsd     = 2e+020       phin    = 0           
+cdsc    = 0.000        cdscb   = 0            cdscd   = 0            cit     = 0           
+voff    = -0.126       etab    = 0           
+vfb     = 0.55         ua      = 2.0e-009     ub      = 0.5e-018      
+uc      = 0            a0      = 1.0          ags     = 1e-020      
+a1      = 0            a2      = 1            b0      = -1e-020      b1      = 0           
+keta    = -0.047       dwg     = 0            dwb     = 0            pclm    = 0.12        
+pdiblc1 = 0.001        pdiblc2 = 0.001        pdiblcb = 3.4e-008     drout   = 0.56        
+pvag    = 1e-020       delta   = 0.01         pscbe1  = 8.14e+008    pscbe2  = 9.58e-007   
58 
 +fprout  = 0.2          pdits   = 0.08         pditsd  = 0.23         pditsl  = 2.3e+006    
+rsh     = 5            rsw     = 85           rdw     = 85         
+rdswmin = 0            rdwmin  = 0            rswmin  = 0            prwg    = 3.22e-008   
+prwb    = 6.8e-011     wr      = 1            alpha0  = 0.074        alpha1  = 0.005       
+beta0   = 30           agidl   = 0.0002       bgidl   = 2.1e+009     cgidl   = 0.0002      
+egidl   = 0.8           
+aigbacc = 0.012        bigbacc = 0.0028       cigbacc = 0.002      
+nigbacc = 1            aigbinv = 0.014        bigbinv = 0.004        cigbinv = 0.004       
+eigbinv = 1.1          nigbinv = 3            aigc    = 0.69         bigc    = 0.0012      
+cigc    = 0.0008       aigsd   = 0.0087       bigsd   = 0.0012       cigsd   = 0.0008      
+nigc    = 1            poxedge = 1            pigcd   = 1            ntox    = 1  
 +xrcrg1  = 12           xrcrg2  = 5           
+cgbo    = 2.56e-011    cgdl    = 2.653e-10 
+cgsl    = 2.653e-10    ckappas = 0.03         ckappad = 0.03         acde    = 1 
+moin    = 15           noff    = 0.9          voffcv  = 0.02 
+kt1     = -0.11        kt1l    = 0            kt2     = 0.022        ute     = -1.5        
+ua1     = 4.31e-009    ub1     = 7.61e-018    uc1     = -5.6e-011    prt     = 0           
+at      = 33000       
+fnoimod = 1            tnoimod = 0           
+jss     = 0.0001       jsws    = 1e-011       jswgs   = 1e-010       njs     = 1           
+ijthsfwd= 0.01         ijthsrev= 0.001        bvs     = 10           xjbvs   = 1           
+jsd     = 0.0001       jswd    = 1e-011       jswgd   = 1e-010       njd     = 1           
+ijthdfwd= 0.01         ijthdrev= 0.001        bvd     = 10           xjbvd   = 1           
+pbs     = 1            cjs     = 0.0005       mjs     = 0.5          pbsws   = 1           
+cjsws   = 5e-010       mjsws   = 0.33         pbswgs  = 1            cjswgs  = 3e-010      
+mjswgs  = 0.33         pbd     = 1            cjd     = 0.0005       mjd     = 0.5         
+pbswd   = 1            cjswd   = 5e-010       mjswd   = 0.33         pbswgd  = 1           
+cjswgd  = 5e-010       mjswgd  = 0.33         tpb     = 0.005        tcj     = 0.001       
+tpbsw   = 0.005        tcjsw   = 0.001        tpbswg  = 0.005        tcjswg  = 0.001       
+xtis    = 3            xtid    = 3           
+dmcg    = 0e-006       dmci    = 0e-006       dmdg    = 0e-006       dmcgt   = 0e-007      
+dwj     = 0.0e-008     xgw     = 0e-007       xgl     = 0e-008      
+rshg    = 0.4          gbmin   = 1e-010       rbpb    = 5            rbpd    = 15         +rbps    = 15           rbdb    = 15           
rbsb    = 15           ngcon   = 1           
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Appendix C SPICE 65 nm Transistor Models 
* Customized PTM 65nm NMOS 
 
.model  nmos  nmos  level = 54 
 
+version = 4.0    binunit = 1    paramchk= 1    mobmod  = 0 
+capmod  = 2      igcmod  = 1    igbmod  = 1    geomod  = 1 
+diomod  = 1      rdsmod  = 0    rbodymod= 1    rgatemod= 1 
+permod  = 1      acnqsmod= 0    trnqsmod= 0 
 
* parameters related to the technology node 
+tnom = 27    epsrox = 3.9 
+eta0 = 0.0058    nfactor = 1.9    wint = 5e-09 
+cgso = 1.5e-10    cgdo = 1.5e-10    xl = -3e-08 
 
* parameters customized by the user 
+toxe = 1.85e-09    toxp = 1.2e-09    toxm = 1.85e-09    toxref = 1.85e-09 
+dtox = 6.5e-10    lint = 5.25e-09 
+vth0 = 0.419    k1 = 0.489    u0 = 0.04934    vsat = 124340 
+rdsw = 165    ndep = 2.51e+18    xj = 1.96e-08 
 
* secondary parameters 
+ll      = 0            wl      = 0            lln     = 1            wln     = 1           
+lw      = 0            ww      = 0            lwn     = 1            wwn     = 1           
+lwl     = 0            wwl     = 0            xpart   = 0                
+k2      = 0.01         k3      = 0           
+k3b     = 0            w0      = 2.5e-006     dvt0    = 1            dvt1    = 2        
+dvt2    = -0.032       dvt0w   = 0            dvt1w   = 0            dvt2w   = 0           
+dsub    = 0.1          minv    = 0.05         voffl   = 0            dvtp0   = 1.0e-009      
+dvtp1   = 0.1          lpe0    = 0            lpeb    = 0                
+ngate   = 2e+020       nsd     = 2e+020       phin    = 0           
+cdsc    = 0.000        cdscb   = 0            cdscd   = 0            cit     = 0           
+voff    = -0.13        etab    = 0           
+vfb     = -0.55        ua      = 6e-010       ub      = 1.2e-018      
+uc      = 0            a0      = 1.0          ags     = 1e-020      
+a1      = 0            a2      = 1.0          b0      = 0            b1      = 0           
+keta    = 0.04         dwg     = 0            dwb     = 0            pclm    = 0.04        
+pdiblc1 = 0.001        pdiblc2 = 0.001        pdiblcb = -0.005       drout   = 0.5         
+pvag    = 1e-020       delta   = 0.01         pscbe1  = 8.14e+008    pscbe2  = 1e-007      
+fprout  = 0.2          pdits   = 0.08         pditsd  = 0.23         pditsl  = 2.3e+006    
+rsh     = 5            rsw     = 85           rdw     = 85         
+rdswmin = 0            rdwmin  = 0            rswmin  = 0            prwg    = 0           
+prwb    = 6.8e-011     wr      = 1            alpha0  = 0.074        alpha1  = 0.005       
+beta0   = 30           agidl   = 0.0002       bgidl   = 2.1e+009     cgidl   = 0.0002      
+egidl   = 0.8           
 
+aigbacc = 0.012        bigbacc = 0.0028       cigbacc = 0.002      
+nigbacc = 1            aigbinv = 0.014        bigbinv = 0.004        cigbinv = 0.004       
+eigbinv = 1.1          nigbinv = 3            aigc    = 0.012        bigc    = 0.0028      
+cigc    = 0.002        aigsd   = 0.012        bigsd   = 0.0028       cigsd   = 0.002      
+nigc    = 1            poxedge = 1            pigcd   = 1            ntox    = 1           
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 +xrcrg1  = 12           xrcrg2  = 5           
+cgbo    = 2.56e-011    cgdl    = 2.653e-10      
+cgsl    = 2.653e-10    ckappas = 0.03         ckappad = 0.03         acde    = 1           
+moin    = 15           noff    = 0.9          voffcv  = 0.02        
 
+kt1     = -0.11        kt1l    = 0            kt2     = 0.022        ute     = -1.5        
+ua1     = 4.31e-009    ub1     = 7.61e-018    uc1     = -5.6e-011    prt     = 0           
+at      = 33000       
 
+fnoimod = 1            tnoimod = 0           
 
+jss     = 0.0001       jsws    = 1e-011       jswgs   = 1e-010       njs     = 1           
+ijthsfwd= 0.01         ijthsrev= 0.001        bvs     = 10           xjbvs   = 1           
+jsd     = 0.0001       jswd    = 1e-011       jswgd   = 1e-010       njd     = 1           
+ijthdfwd= 0.01         ijthdrev= 0.001        bvd     = 10           xjbvd   = 1           
+pbs     = 1            cjs     = 0.0005       mjs     = 0.5          pbsws   = 1           
+cjsws   = 5e-010       mjsws   = 0.33         pbswgs  = 1            cjswgs  = 3e-010      
+mjswgs  = 0.33         pbd     = 1            cjd     = 0.0005       mjd     = 0.5         
+pbswd   = 1            cjswd   = 5e-010       mjswd   = 0.33         pbswgd  = 1           
+cjswgd  = 5e-010       mjswgd  = 0.33         tpb     = 0.005        tcj     = 0.001       
+tpbsw   = 0.005        tcjsw   = 0.001        tpbswg  = 0.005        tcjswg  = 0.001       
+xtis    = 3            xtid    = 3           
 
+dmcg    = 0e-006       dmci    = 0e-006       dmdg    = 0e-006       dmcgt   = 0e-007      
+dwj     = 0.0e-008     xgw     = 0e-007       xgl     = 0e-008      
 
+rshg    = 0.4          gbmin   = 1e-010       rbpb    = 5            rbpd    = 15          
+rbps    = 15           rbdb    = 15           rbsb    = 15           ngcon   = 1           
 
* Customized PTM 65nm PMOS 
 
.model  pmos  pmos  level = 54 
 
+version = 4.0    binunit = 1    paramchk= 1    mobmod  = 0 
+capmod  = 2      igcmod  = 1    igbmod  = 1    geomod  = 1 
+diomod  = 1      rdsmod  = 0    rbodymod= 1    rgatemod= 1 
+permod  = 1      acnqsmod= 0    trnqsmod= 0 
 
* parameters related to the technology node 
+tnom = 27    epsrox = 3.9 
+eta0 = 0.0058    nfactor = 1.9    wint = 5e-09 
+cgso = 1.5e-10    cgdo = 1.5e-10    xl = -3e-08 
 
* parameters customized by the user 
+toxe = 1.95e-09    toxp = 1.2e-09    toxm = 1.95e-09    toxref = 1.95e-09 
+dtox = 7.5e-10    lint = 5.25e-09 
+vth0 = -0.367    k1 = 0.447    u0 = 0.00568    vsat = 70000 
+rdsw = 170    ndep = 1.89e+18    xj = 1.96e-08 
 
*secondary parameters 
+ll      = 0            wl      = 0            lln     = 1            wln     = 1           
+lw      = 0            ww      = 0            lwn     = 1            wwn     = 1           
+lwl     = 0            wwl     = 0            xpart   = 0                
+k2      = -0.01        k3      = 0           
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 +k3b     = 0            w0      = 2.5e-006     dvt0    = 1            dvt1    = 2        
+dvt2    = -0.032       dvt0w   = 0            dvt1w   = 0            dvt2w   = 0           
+dsub    = 0.1          minv    = 0.05         voffl   = 0            dvtp0   = 1e-009      
+dvtp1   = 0.05         lpe0    = 0            lpeb    = 0                
+ngate   = 2e+020       nsd     = 2e+020       phin    = 0           
+cdsc    = 0.000        cdscb   = 0            cdscd   = 0            cit     = 0           
+voff    = -0.126       etab    = 0           
+vfb     = 0.55         ua      = 2.0e-009     ub      = 0.5e-018      
+uc      = 0            a0      = 1.0          ags     = 1e-020      
+a1      = 0            a2      = 1            b0      = -1e-020      b1      = 0           
+keta    = -0.047       dwg     = 0            dwb     = 0            pclm    = 0.12        
+pdiblc1 = 0.001        pdiblc2 = 0.001        pdiblcb = 3.4e-008     drout   = 0.56        
+pvag    = 1e-020       delta   = 0.01         pscbe1  = 8.14e+008    pscbe2  = 9.58e-007   
+fprout  = 0.2          pdits   = 0.08         pditsd  = 0.23         pditsl  = 2.3e+006    
+rsh     = 5            rsw     = 85           rdw     = 85         
+rdswmin = 0            rdwmin  = 0            rswmin  = 0            prwg    = 3.22e-008   
+prwb    = 6.8e-011     wr      = 1            alpha0  = 0.074        alpha1  = 0.005       
+beta0   = 30           agidl   = 0.0002       bgidl   = 2.1e+009     cgidl   = 0.0002      
+egidl   = 0.8           
 
+aigbacc = 0.012        bigbacc = 0.0028       cigbacc = 0.002      
+nigbacc = 1            aigbinv = 0.014        bigbinv = 0.004        cigbinv = 0.004       
+eigbinv = 1.1          nigbinv = 3            aigc    = 0.69         bigc    = 0.0012      
+cigc    = 0.0008       aigsd   = 0.0087       bigsd   = 0.0012       cigsd   = 0.0008      
+nigc    = 1            poxedge = 1            pigcd   = 1            ntox    = 1  
          
+xrcrg1  = 12           xrcrg2  = 5           
+cgbo    = 2.56e-011    cgdl    = 2.653e-10 
+cgsl    = 2.653e-10    ckappas = 0.03         ckappad = 0.03         acde    = 1 
+moin    = 15           noff    = 0.9          voffcv  = 0.02 
 
+kt1     = -0.11        kt1l    = 0            kt2     = 0.022        ute     = -1.5        
+ua1     = 4.31e-009    ub1     = 7.61e-018    uc1     = -5.6e-011    prt     = 0           
+at      = 33000       
 
+fnoimod = 1            tnoimod = 0           
 
+jss     = 0.0001       jsws    = 1e-011       jswgs   = 1e-010       njs     = 1           
+ijthsfwd= 0.01         ijthsrev= 0.001        bvs     = 10           xjbvs   = 1           
+jsd     = 0.0001       jswd    = 1e-011       jswgd   = 1e-010       njd     = 1           
+ijthdfwd= 0.01         ijthdrev= 0.001        bvd     = 10           xjbvd   = 1           
+pbs     = 1            cjs     = 0.0005       mjs     = 0.5          pbsws   = 1           
+cjsws   = 5e-010       mjsws   = 0.33         pbswgs  = 1            cjswgs  = 3e-010      
+mjswgs  = 0.33         pbd     = 1            cjd     = 0.0005       mjd     = 0.5         
+pbswd   = 1            cjswd   = 5e-010       mjswd   = 0.33         pbswgd  = 1           
+cjswgd  = 5e-010       mjswgd  = 0.33         tpb     = 0.005        tcj     = 0.001       
+tpbsw   = 0.005        tcjsw   = 0.001        tpbswg  = 0.005        tcjswg  = 0.001       
+xtis    = 3            xtid    = 3           
 
+dmcg    = 0e-006       dmci    = 0e-006       dmdg    = 0e-006       dmcgt   = 0e-007      
+dwj     = 0.0e-008     xgw     = 0e-007       xgl     = 0e-008      
 
+rshg    = 0.4          gbmin   = 1e-010       rbpb    = 5            rbpd    = 15          
+rbps    = 15           rbdb    = 15           rbsb    = 15           ngcon   = 1           
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 Appendix D.  Inverter SPICE Netlists 
 
.subckt INV_130 IN OUT GND VDD 
 
M1 VDD IN OUT VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u 
M2 OUT IN 0 0 nmos L=0.130u W=0.39u 
 
.ends INV_130 
 
 
.subckt INV_90 IN OUT GND VDD 
 
M1 VDD IN OUT VDD pmos L=.09u W=0.54u 
M2 OUT IN 0 0 nmos L=0.09u W=0.27u 
 
.ends INV_90 
 
 
.subckt INV_65 IN OUT GND VDD 
 
M1 VDD IN OUT VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u 
M2 OUT IN 0 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u 
 
.ends INV_65 
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Appendix E.  NAND Gate SPICE Netlists 
 
.subckt NAND_130 IN1 IN2 OUT GND VDD 
 
M1 OUT IN1 VDD VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u 
M2 OUT IN2 VDD VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u 
M3 OUT IN2 MIDN 0 nmos L=0.130u W=0.39u 
M4 MIDN IN1 0 0 nmos L=0.130u W=0.39u 
 
.ends NAND_130 
 
.subckt NAND_90 IN1 IN2 OUT GND VDD 
 
M1 OUT IN1 VDD VDD pmos L=.09u W=0.54u 
M2 OUT IN2 VDD VDD pmos L=.09u W=0.54u 
M3 OUT IN2 MIDN 0 nmos L=0.09u W=0.27u 
M4 MIDN IN1 0 0 nmos L=0.09u W=0.27u 
 
.ends NAND_90 
 
.subckt NAND_65 IN1 IN2 OUT GND VDD 
 
M1 OUT IN1 VDD VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u 
M2 OUT IN2 VDD VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u 
M3 OUT IN2 MIDN 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u 
M4 MIDN IN1 0 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u 
 
.ends NAND_65 
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Appendix F.  XOR Gate SPICE Netlists 
 
.subckt XOR_130 IN1 IN2 NOTIN1 NOTIN2 OUT GND VDD 
M1 MIDP1 IN2 VDD VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u 
M2 OUT NOTIN1 MIDP1 VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u 
M3 MIDP2 NOTIN2 VDD VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u 
M4 OUT IN1 MIDP2 VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u 
M5 OUT NOTIN1 MIDN1 0 nmos L=0.130u W=0.39u 
M6 MIDN1 NOTIN2 0 0 nmos L=0.130u W=0.39u 
M7 OUT IN1 MIDN2 0 nmos L=0.130u W=0.39u 
M8 MIDN2 IN2 0 0 nmos L=0.130u W=0.39u 
.ends XOR_130 
.subckt XOR_90 IN1 IN2 NOTIN1 NOTIN2 OUT GND VDD 
M1 MIDP1 IN2 VDD VDD pmos L=.09u W=0.54u 
M2 OUT NOTIN1 MIDP1 VDD pmos L=.09u W=0.54u 
M3 MIDP2 NOTIN2 VDD VDD pmos L=.09u W=0.54u 
M4 OUT IN1 MIDP2 VDD pmos L=.09u W=0.54u 
M5 OUT NOTIN1 MIDN1 0 nmos L=0.09u W=0.27u 
M6 MIDN1 NOTIN2 0 0 nmos L=0.09u W=0.27u 
M7 OUT IN1 MIDN2 0 nmos L=0.09u W=0.27u 
M8 MIDN2 IN2 0 0 nmos L=0.09u W=0.27u 
.ends XOR_90 
.subckt XOR_65 IN1 IN2 NOTIN1 NOTIN2 OUT GND VDD 
M1 MIDP1 IN2 VDD VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u 
M2 OUT NOTIN1 MIDP1 VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u 
M3 MIDP2 NOTIN2 VDD VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u 
M4 OUT IN1 MIDP2 VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u 
M5 OUT NOTIN1 MIDN1 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u 
M6 MIDN1 NOTIN2 0 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u 
M7 OUT IN1 MIDN2 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u 
M8 MIDN2 IN2 0 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u 
.ends XOR_65 
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Appendix G.  SRAM SPICE Netlists 
 
.subckt SRAM_130 BIT BIT_NOT A A_NOT WORD GND VDD 
 
M1 A WORD BIT 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u 
M2 A_NOT WORD BIT_NOT 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u 
M3 A A_NOT 0 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u 
M4 A_NOT A 0 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u 
M5 A A_NOT VDD VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u 
M6 A_NOT A VDD VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u 
.ends SRAM_130 
 
.subckt SRAM_90 BIT BIT_NOT A A_NOT WORD GND VDD 
 
M1 A WORD BIT 0 nmos L=.09u W=0.27u 
M2 A_NOT WORD BIT_NOT 0 nmos L=.09u W=0.27u 
M3 A A_NOT 0 0 nmos L=.09u W=0.27u 
M4 A_NOT A 0 0 nmos L=.09u W=0.27u 
M5 A A_NOT VDD VDD pmos L=.09u W=0.54u 
M6 A_NOT A VDD VDD pmos L=.09u W=0.54u 
.ends SRAM_90 
.subckt SRAM_65 BIT BIT_NOT A A_NOT WORD GND VDD 
 
M1 A WORD BIT 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u 
M2 A_NOT WORD BIT_NOT 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u 
M3 A A_NOT 0 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u 
M4 A_NOT A 0 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u 
M5 A A_NOT VDD VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u 
M6 A_NOT A VDD VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u 
.ends SRAM_65 
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Appendix H.  DICE SPICE Netlists 
 
.subckt DICE_130 BIT BIT_NOT A A_NOT WORD GND VDD 
 
M1 INT1 WORD BIT 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u 
M2 INT2 WORD BIT_NOT 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u 
M3 A WORD BIT 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u 
M4 A_NOT WORD BIT_NOT 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u 
M5 A_NOT A 0 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u 
M6 INT1 A 0 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u 
M7 INT2 INT1 0 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u 
M8 A INT2 0 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u 
M9 A_NOT INT1 VDD VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u 
M10 INT1 INT2 VDD VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u 
M11 INT2 A VDD VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u 
M12 A A_NOT VDD VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u 
.ends DICE_130 
 
.subckt DICE_90 BIT BIT_NOT A A_NOT WORD GND VDD 
 
M1 INT1 WORD BIT 0 nmos L=.09u W=0.27u 
M2 INT2 WORD BIT_NOT 0 nmos L=.09u W=0. 27u 
M3 A WORD BIT 0 nmos L=.09u W=0. 27u 
M4 A_NOT WORD BIT_NOT 0 nmos L=.09u W=0. 27u 
M5 A_NOT A 0 0 nmos L=.09u W=0. 27u 
M6 INT1 A 0 0 nmos L=.09u W=0. 27u 
M7 INT2 INT1 0 0 nmos L=.09u W=0. 27u 
M8 A INT2 0 0 nmos L=.09u W=0. 27u 
M9 A_NOT INT1 VDD VDD pmos L=.09u W=0. 54u 
M10 INT1 INT2 VDD VDD pmos L=.09u W=0. 54u 
M11 INT2 A VDD VDD pmos L=.09u W=0. 54u 
M12 A A_NOT VDD VDD pmos L=.09u W=0. 54u 
.ends DICE_90 
 
.subckt DICE_65 BIT BIT_NOT A A_NOT WORD GND VDD 
 
M1 INT1 WORD BIT 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u 
M2 INT2 WORD BIT_NOT 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u 
M3 A WORD BIT 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u 
M4 A_NOT WORD BIT_NOT 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u 
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 M5 A_NOT A 0 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u 
M6 INT1 A 0 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u 
M7 INT2 INT1 0 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u 
M8 A INT2 0 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u 
M9 A_NOT INT1 VDD VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u 
M10 INT1 INT2 VDD VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u 
M11 INT2 A VDD VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u 
M12 A A_NOT VDD VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u 
.ends DICE_650 
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